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ABSTRACT
Background: A prevalent assumption in hospital emergency preparedness planning is that patient arrival from a di-
saster scene will occur through a coordinated system of patient distribution based on the number of victims, ca-
pabilities of the receiving hospitals, and the nature and severity of illness or injury. In spite of the strength of the
emergency medical services system, case reports in the literature and major incident after-action reports have
shown that most patients who present at a health care facility after a disaster or other major emergency do not
necessarily arrive via ambulance. If these reports of arrival of patients outside an organized emergency medical
services system are accurate, then hospitals should be planning differently for the impact of an unorganized influx
of patients on the health care system. Hospitals need to consider alternative patterns of patient referral, including
the mass convergence of self-referred patients, when performing major incident planning.
Methods:We conducted a retrospective review of published studies from the past 25 years to identify reports of
patient care during disasters or major emergency incidents that described the patients’ method of arrival at
the hospital. Using a structured mechanism, we aggregated and analyzed the data.
Results: Detailed data on 8303 patients from more than 25 years of literature were collected. Many reports sug-
gest that only a fraction of the patients who are treated in emergency departments following disasters arrive
via ambulance, particularly in the early postincident stages of an event. Our 25 years of aggregate data sug-
gest that only 36% of disaster victims are transported to hospitals via ambulance, whereas 63% use alternate
means to seek emergency medical care.
Conclusions: Hospitals should evaluate their emergency plans to consider the implications of alternate referral
patterns of patients during a disaster. Additional consideration should be given to mass triage, site security,
and the potential need for decontamination after a major incident.
(Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2010;4:226-231)
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The emergency medical services (EMS) system isan effective means of delivering prehospital medi-cal care and transporting ill or injured victims to
definitive care facilities. Essential components of the pre-
hospital response to disasters includes scene size-up and
site controls, the rapid triage of victims, determination of
the need for emergency decontamination, and the pro-
vision of basic medical care.1 In addition, during the EMS
management of mass casualty incidents (MCIs) and rou-
tine emergencies, consideration is given to the nature and
severity of injuries or illness and the capabilities of local
receiving hospitals when transport decisions are made.1
Ideally, EMS attempts to transport victims to facilities that
are able to accept patients and that have the appropriate
specialty services to treat critically injured victims (eg,
trauma, burns).1 Hospitals have come to rely upon these
facets of the EMS system and expect that during a mass
casualty event they will receive advance notification of
the incident, and patients will be sent to receiving facili-
ties based on the facilities’ capacity and capabilities.
Indisasters,however,victims’behavior isoftenunpredict-
able. Injured people seldom linger at the scene after a ter-
rorist incidentormajoremergency forEMStoarrive, con-
trol the scene, and arrange transport to hospitals. Because
scene controls and site security take time to implement,
“the walking wounded” and individuals who can self-
extricatewillgenerally leavethedisastersiteandseeksafety
before thearrivalofEMS.2-6 There isnoreliablewaytoen-
sure that all of the victims of a disaster or act of terrorism
willremainonsite.Unfortunately,thismaymeanthatsome
people who require urgent medical care may not receive
it, victims may unknowingly be contaminated with a haz-
ardous substance, andhospitalsmaybe surprisedbyanun-
announced convergence of walk-in patients after a disas-
ter.This self-referralbehaviorcanbeasignificantproblem
in lightof reports released in thepast several years thatde-
scribe the lack of preparedness of hospitals, particularly as
it relates to triage, mass care, and decontamination.6-10
Additional factors that can make the self-referral pat-
tern more significant is that there are often greater num-
bers of people with minor illnesses and injuries after a
disaster or terrorist event than there are victims with
critical or life-threatening injuries.2-6,11-22 This is of par-
ticular importance because “the walking wounded” are
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more likely than a nonambulatory, critically injured person to
flee a disaster scene. In addition, it is becoming apparent that
people who are not physically ill or injured but insist on seek-
ing medical care, often referred to as “the worried well,” will
also self-present to health care facilities. This population of pa-
tients can be large and may include members of the public who
were not exposed directly to harm.23-25
Auf der Heide attempted to shed some light on a variety of di-
saster planning assumptions routinely used by health care emer-
gency managers.6 Many of these assumptions are based on con-
ventional wisdom and do not accurately reflect the actual
behaviors exhibited by emergency responders, prehospital per-
sonnel, or the public during and immediately after a disaster.6
Unfortunately, not all emergency planners have discovered this
work and considered it in developing their hospital emer-
gency preparedness plans for mass casualty events. We have fo-
cused on 1 of these critical assumptions, which we believe has
an important impact on hospital disaster planning.
Case reports in the literature and major incident after-action re-
ports have shown that many people who may be ill or injured af-
ter a disaster or major incident do not necessarily arrive at emer-
gency departments (EDs), hospitals, and trauma centers via
ambulance.2-6,11,12,15-22 If these reports are accurate, then hospitals
and emergency managers should be planning differently for a mass
convergence of patients on the health care system. Such plan-
ning includes considering alternative patterns of patient presen-
tation including self-referral and managing ill or injured victims
who may be hazardous or infectious. Failure to plan accordingly
may affect the ability of the health care system to respond ad-
equately to the health and medical needs of the public after a di-
saster, act of terrorism, or public health emergency.
We performed a systematic review of the medical literature pub-
lished in the past 25 years to identify case reports, research stud-
ies, and after-action analyses that describe the specific means that
patients have used to access medical care in hospital EDs imme-
diatelyafteradisaster,actof terrorism,orpublichealthemergency.
METHODS
A comprehensive medical literature database search was per-
formed using the MEDLINE/PubMed search engines. The in-
vestigators identified reports of patient care after disasters or
major emergency incidents. Reports were queried for specific
information on how the patients presented to or were referred
to hospitals immediately after a disaster or significant event.
Final articles were selected based on their reporting of how vic-
tims were transported to medical centers and hospitals after the
incident. The time frame was limited to 25 years of the pub-
lished literature, 1983-2008.
Articles were identified through a targeted key word search that
identified articles that appeared to contain data relevant to our
investigation. Key words included but were not limited toEMS,
ambulance, paramedic, MICU, hospital, emergency department,
triage, disaster, terrorism,MCI, self-referred, referral patterns, and
transport. Special attention was paid to articles that described
after-action reports, lessons learned, and emergency medical care
in a postdisaster environment. Articles were specifically re-
viewed to determine whether the article reported the number
of patients and the method of transportation of victims to hos-
pital EDs. Victims who were explicitly not transported, in other
words, patients who died at the scene, refused care, or were
treated and released by on-the-scene personnel, were ex-
cluded from the study. The authors abstracted data from each
manuscript and entered it into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet
(Microsoft, Redmond, WA). Basic descriptive statistics are re-
ported in aggregate (Table 1).
Data were divided into 3 categories: transported by ambu-
lance, self-transport, and other and were placed into each cat-
egory in this analysis using the following parameters:
• Ambulance: Patients entered into this category were spe-
cifically designated by the study authors as having been trans-
ported in an ambulance (air or ground) or specifically trans-
ported by emergency medical services.
• Self-transport to the hospital: Any study that indicated that
patients “presented themselves,” were considered “walking
wounded,” or used “private vehicles” was placed into this
category.
• Other: This category was reserved for patients who did not
ride in an ambulance (air or ground) or who explicitly did not
meet the criteria for self-transport. Patients in this category
arrived at hospitals mostly by bus, mass transit, or did not have
the mode of transportation clearly delineated in the study but
were certain to have been treated at the hospital.
RESULTS
A total of 166 reviews of disasters or major incidents were iden-
tified in the literature; 22 (13.3%) reported specific data on the
transportation of casualties from the scene to hospitals
(Table 1).2-5,11-22,26-32 The studies included contained a hetero-
geneous cross-section of disasters from natural and human made
to acts of terrorism (Figure 1).
The final analysis consisted of 8303 patients from 24 separate
disasters or terrorist events. Nearly all of the case reports re-
viewed discussed the importance of the prehospital emergency
care system. However, most suggest that only a fraction of the
patients who are treated arrive at the ED via ambulance, par-
ticularly in the early postincident stages of a disaster.2-5,11,12,15-22
Overall, only 2980 (35.9%) of patients involved in these 24
disasters were transported to hospitals in ambulances; 5244
(63.2%) were transported to medical facilities via alternate means
of transportation (Figure 2). Of the patients who were not trans-
ported in ambulances, 4813 (91.8%) transported themselves
to hospitals for medical care and 431 (8.2%) sought other means
of transportation to hospitals.
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The categories most clearly defined across the studies were pa-
tients who were transported in ambulances and patients who
transported themselves to hospitals. There were a variety of
alternative means of transport to EDs in the 24 studies. These
nonambulance methods were placed into the “other” cat-
egory. Some studies described these methods, such as bus or
coach transportation5,14,15,18,21,22; others did not describe these
methods.4,11,12,32
In general, patients who were not transported were placed into
1 of 3 categories: treated at the scene and released, died at the
scene, or refused medical treatment or transportation. For the
TABLE 1
Categorization of Patients From Each Studya
Event Patients, No. Ambulance Self-Transport Other No Transport
Taba terrorist attack: suicide bombings15 200 15 (7.5) 20 (10) 133 (66.5) 32 (16)
San Diego firestorm32 138 105 (76.1) 0 (0) 18 (13) 15 (10.9)
London bombings18 194 2 (1) 167 (86.1) 25 (12.9) 0 (0)
African soccer stadium stampede17 56 21 (37.5) 23 (41.1) 0 (0) 12 (21.4)
Elks lodge building collapse11 50 15 (30) 14 (28) 16 (32) 5 (10)
Suicide bombing of Tel Aviv nightclub30 56 39 (69.6) 17 (30.4) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Oklahoma City bombing4,5 388 90 (23.2) 179 (46.1) 119 (30.7) 0 (0)
World Trade Center sample3 1103 282 (25.6) 821 (74.4) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Australian bushfires20 139 56 (40.3) 83 (59.7) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Volendam cafe´ fire21 233 107 (45.9) 108 (46.4) 18 (7.7) 0 (0)
Reading, UK, train crash14 76 34 (44.7) 0 (0) 36 (47.4) 6 (7.9)
New York City power outage (2003)13 23 13 (56.5) 8 (34.8) 2 (8.7) 0 (0)
Turkish plane crash26 21 21 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Coal mine explosion27 40 40 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Mass shooting28 22 22 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Madrid train bombings2 1180 388 (32.9) 792 (67.1) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Truck explosion12 82 1 (1.2) 20 (24.4) 61 (74.4) 0 (0)
Bus bombing29 58 55 (94.8) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (5.2)
Air show accident16 45 3 (6.7) 42 (93.3) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Florida hurricanes (2004)19 3958 1562 (39.5) 2396 (60.5) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Suicide bombing31 91 57 (62.6) 28 (30.8) 0 (0) 6 (6.6)
Chlorine release from train derailment22 150 52 (34.7) 95 (63.3) 3 (2) 0 (0)
25-Year totals 8303 2980 (35.9) 4813 (58.0) 431 (5.2) 79 (1.0)
aData are expressed as No. (%).
FIGURE 1
Types of disasters by category.
 Terrorist Natural Man-Made Accident
Taba terrorist attack: Suicide bombings San Diego firestorm Soccer stadium stampede in Africa
London bombings Brushfires in Australia Elks lodge building collapse
Suicide bombing of Tel Aviv nightclub Hurricane Charley Cafe fire in Volendam
Oklahoma City bombing - 1995 Hurricane Frances Train crash in Reading, UK
World Trade Center 2001 Hurricane Jeanne NYC power outage 2003
Madrid train bombings  Plane crash in Turkey
Bus bombing  Coal mine explosion
Suicide bombing  Mass shooting
  Lorry explosion
  Air show accident
  Chlorine release from train derailment
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purposes of this analysis, these patients were excluded and only
amounted to 79 (1%; Table 1).
COMMENT
Some assumptions are made by emergency planners about the
referral patterns of patients to hospitals after a disaster, act of
terrorism, or public health emergency. One assumption, as noted
in previous investigations, is that if patients are acutely ill or
injured, then they will arrive at hospitals, primarily by ambu-
lance.6 Another common assumption is that when patients do
arrive at hospital EDs, they will have been transported to fa-
cilities that can provide the appropriate specialty care that is
needed, based on their injuries (eg, burn care, trauma care,
pediatrics).6 The final assumption is that patients arriving by
EMS-initiated transportation will have been appropriately tri-
aged, decontaminated if necessary, and given medical treat-
ment or stabilized before arrival.6 These assumptions are usu-
ally based on the perceived strength of the EMS system.1
Although during normal EMS system operations patients typi-
cally are triaged to receiving facilities based on their condition
and any specialty care that they may need, during an MCI or di-
saster patients may need to be transported to facilities that lack
certain specialty capabilities to deliver all of the victims to an
acute care hospital. As a result, the hospital may need to alter
its normal standard of care to meet the needs of patients with
higher acuity or more complex clinical needs. In addition, pa-
tients who require decontamination may present to the ED. If a
hospital is in close proximity to the incident location, then mul-
tiple patients may converge rapidly on the facility and special
security and/or lockdown considerations may exist. Hospital emer-
gency managers who are not planning for the likelihood of a mass
convergence of self-referred patients from a disaster, act of ter-
rorism, or public health emergency may be putting the safety and
health of their staff, patients, and visitors in jeopardy.
In many locations, the EMS system is strong; however, our in-
vestigation has validated previous work showing that patients
often disregard EMS and show up at the ED on their
own.2-6,11,12,15-22 Many victims who survive these events flee the
scene well before the first arriving emergency vehicles and may
well be on their way to the closest medical facilities. In fact,
many will have minor injuries or illnesses that do not inhibit
patients who are able to self-transport to hospitals after the
event.2-6,11-22 As a result, hospitals must be prepared to perform
initial triage of “the walking wounded” (outside the hospital,
in case of contaminated patients). In addition, facilities must
have the ability to perform emergency decontamination of mul-
tiple victims, enforce tight perimeter security, including lock-
out or lockdown procedures when necessary, and create an area
for “the worried well” and people with minor injuries to be cared
for while awaiting the potential arrival of more critically in-
jured or ill victims from the scene.6
In addition to the implications for hospital emergency plan-
ners, this study also has implications for incident command per-
sonnel at the scene of an event. Although scene controls, such
as establishing a perimeter, delineating hot/warm/cold zones,
estimating numbers of victims, and assigning kinds and types
of resources, take time to be put in place, many ambulatory pa-
tients will leave the scene. The self-extrication of “walking
wounded” victims may pose special challenges. It may be more
difficult to first estimate the true number of victims from an
event, when many may be actively leaving the scene. “Walk-
ing wounded” patients may be contaminated or infectious and
may spread illness or cause secondary exposure to other people
or locations. Mass dispersal of victims with minor illnesses or
injuries may result in the loss of forensic evidence or make wit-
ness interviews after a criminal or terrorist event difficult. Epi-
demiologic investigations may also be affected by limiting the
tracking of cases and ability to perform case and contact trac-
ing. All of these reasons are important to emphasize scene se-
curity and perimeter controls as soon as possible when respond-
ing to a major incident.
There were several limitations to this study. First, our litera-
ture review initially returned 166 articles; however, only 22
reported complete data that were useable for analysis of this
research question (Table 1). One reason for this low number
of included studies is the underwhelming number of pub-
lished case reports or after-action reports in the peer
reviewed literature that reported, in sufficient detail, how
victims arrived at hospitals after the event. A second reason
was that many articles discussed transportation of casualties
to hospitals, but they did not provide quantifiable data to
report in this study. In addition, we purposely excluded
articles published in non–English-language journals, which
may have contributed to lower numbers for our analysis.
Because these articles were not read for inclusion, it is
impossible to estimate how many of them would have been
appropriate for inclusion in this review. To remedy this in
future analyses, we suggest that future investigators of emer-
FIGURE 2
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gency care and treatment of casualties postdisaster report
data on how patients arrived at hospitals, trauma centers,
and EDs. This may help provide a more accurate picture of
the ways in which patients access emergency care after a
disaster.
Second, the scope of our literature review was somewhat nar-
row—only 25 years retrospectively using only the PubMed/
MEDLINE database. Because not all after-action reports ap-
pear in the medical peer-reviewed literature, the Lessons Learned
Information System database operated by the Department of
Homeland Security was also consulted, but it contained mainly
executive summaries of incidents without actual numbers and
dispositions of casualties. With such few investigators report-
ing useable data, this time frame may have been too short to
yield enough data to generalize to all types of disasters. Future
studies should look at longer time periods and multiple search
engines to gather a more representative sample.
Third, because cases in which victims were transported by bus
to hospitals for treatment were placed in the “other” category,
we did not have enough information to determine whether this
meant that patients chose to take buses to hospitals or whether
EMS personnel arranged for ambulatory or “walking wounded”
patients to ride in chartered buses for the purposes of mass trans-
portation to medical centers. If this were part of the local EMS
response, then these patients would have been triaged and pos-
sibly treated on the scene by prehospital personnel and hospi-
tals notified of their impending arrival. Even if we assumed that
all of the patients in the “other” category were EMS-initiated
transports, then it would still result in only 40% of the disaster
victims arriving via ambulance. This result would not change
our interpretation of the results of our study; more victims of
disasters who choose to seek immediate medical attention will
arrive at hospitals through self-transport than via EMS or am-
bulance transportation.
Fourth, because it is, in general, easy to quantify the number of
patients transported in ambulances to hospitals through EMS
call logs and data available in patient care reports, there is no
mechanism for reliable quantification of patients who self-
refer to medical treatment after disasters. This is of particular
concern when victims seek treatment at clinics, urgent care cen-
ters, or their primary care physicians and not hospitals. This
may have resulted in an underreporting of patients in the
self-transport category, biasing our results in favor of
EMS-initiated transport mechanisms to hospitals and medical
centers.
CONCLUSIONS
Our study suggests that after a disaster, act of terrorism, or
public health emergency, victims most often present to hos-
pitals and EDs through self-referral rather than via ambu-
lance transportation, validating previous work in this area.
The implications for hospitals should include the develop-
ment of emergency procedures and preparedness plans that
address the complications associated with a mass influx of
walk-in or self-referred patients after a disaster. Emergency
procedures and preparedness plans should include staff ’s pro-
ficiency in triage, ability to perform emergency decontami-
nation, and safety and security procedures should they
encounter a patient surge at their facility. Future studies
should attempt to report how victims reach emergency care
in disasters so that we may better understand referral pat-
terns after mass casualty events.
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